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Book Review: The Political Power of the Business Corporation
Thanks to successful wealth generation and ideological victories, the large business
corporation has become an effective political actor and has entered into partnership with
government in the design of public policy and delivery of public services. In this book Stephen
Wilks argues that governmental and corporate elites have transformed British politics to
create a ‘new corporate state’ with similar patterns in the USA, in competitor economies –
including China – and in global governance. Reviewed by Nizar Manek.
The Polit ical Power of the Business Corporation. Stephen Wilks. Edward Elgar.
March 2013.
Find this book: 
For an individual who owns f if teen or so shares in, say, Brit ish Petroleum,
it would be a bold move indeed to attempt to take to task management’s
strategic decisions on environmental saf ety systems in, say, the Gulf  of
Mexico. For when shareholdings are so dispersed, what incentive would
the prof it-maximising shareholder have to monitor an issue so seemingly
obscure? Why not simply rely on a f elicitous rush to the exits when the
investment action starts to turn cold; or, in BP’s case, when the drilling rig
explodes and the stock starts to limp? And when a risk-taking
shareholder is protected by the principle of  limited liability, what incentive
would they have to cause an upset against a strategy of  cost-cutting
that’s apparently geared toward maximising shareholder value in the f irst
place?
“Do I do the deed and sell my shares?” the passive, calculating investor
asks. What, then, of  broader stakeholders and categories of  claimant whose f ate is tangled up
with the f irm – creditors, employees, the environment?
The line of  reasoning will be f amiliar: it f ollows the spirit of  a thesis put f orward eighty years ago by
pioneering US corporate studies scholars Adolf  Berle and Gardiner Means – that the 1930s f inancial crisis
revealed shareholder rights to be only theoretical. While individual shareholders are owners of  the f irm,
they remain in ef f ect powerless over caprice in managerial decision-making. And so the idea of  shareholder
democracy is f lawed at best, even as managers dedicate themselves to the pursuit of  shareholder value –
always with one eye on the next quarterly report.
In the event of  a legal dispute, it ’s improbable that a court would be able to quantif y that directors have or
haven’t maximised prof its; and so managers have f ree reign. Corporate America, or, indeed, Britain Plc, is
run by a small group of  executives accountable to no-one. Shareholders surrender to management, the
argument goes. Though they can and do exit, when they are theoretical owners, they bow into the
corporate equivalent of  a Hobbesian bargain.
Four decades ago, Stephen Wilks began to mull a similar intellectual puzzle as grappled with the sprawling
power of  the business corporation. Then a young academic, he believed it possible to bring these
concentrations of  economic power under democratic control. Now a Prof essor of  Polit ics at the University
of  Exeter, he is more circumspect.
In a much-needed and important overview and analysis of  the f ield that should appeal to students of
polit ical science and corporate law, Wilks argues the f orces that created the corporation have ‘unleashed
new autocrats, immune f rom ef f ective polit ical control.’ His argument in The Political Power of the Business
Corporation is that it is impossible to understand the ‘structural dependence’ between the state and the
corporation without studying the corporation in its mould as a polit ical actor.
But though Wilks leans on the structural dependence approach, he disagrees with identif ying a business
elite with a ‘capitalist ruling class.’ No Marxist, he of f ers a good argument that this would downplay the
importance of  managerial control – the central f eature of  managerial capitalism. Instead, he f avours the
idea of  an ‘elite of  corporations,’ and theref ore corporate governance and its attempts to oversee
management discretion is central to his analysis of  corporate power. As multinational corporations f rom the
emergent economies grow in size and begin to internationalise against their Western peers, Wilks argues it
will be key to watch the extent they too would become managerially controlled with a separation of
ownership and control.
Wilks’ concern with the ethical dilemmas posed by the separation of  shareholder ownership and managerial
control leads into a f urther issue: apparent undue inf luence of  multinational corporation as a ‘governing
institution’ and ‘partner ’ in global governance. Corporate power, he argues, can become independent of
nation states, and ‘so embedded in global regimes that it has taken on almost a constitutional character.’
The multinational corporation is an important source of  global rules and regulations in its own right, he
argues, as a conscious polit ical actor that works ‘with and through states to shape regulatory regimes
which in turn discipline governments.’
Though Wilks’ argument appears to support it, Wilks hints that an analysis that embeds corporate authority
in a global ‘constitution’ is necessarily speculative; he does not do much to develop this argument.
Perhaps Wilks reserves his most f orcef ul points f or the chapter on corporate governance. His conclusion
is that the UK Corporate Governance Code, a non-statutory best practices code, is ‘ludicrous’. That is
contestable: given the diversity of  companies and markets, a one size f its all approach to corporate
governance is unlikely to be ef f ective, and the code’s ‘comply or explain’ approach arguably embodies a
successf ul and still evolving alternative. But Wilks does get to the heart of  the matter with several points.
Most importantly, he argues that there are ‘no provisions as to what f orm of  explanation f or non-
compliance should take, no guidelines f or acceptable explanations, and no sanctions.’
And while a separate ‘Stewardship Code’ exhorts institutional investors to be more active, ‘the vast majority
of  share investors have neither the time nor the inclination to monitor, to engage and to seek to inf luence
boards.’ Much emphasis is placed on such ‘market regulation’, but Wilks argues ‘there is no clear evidence
that even these assumed market pressures are ef f ective.’ Cit ing research f rom the University of  Glasgow
School of  Law, he notes that ‘in f act f or some periods the reverse is the case with non-complying
corporations having above average share price increases.’
For institutional investors in a company such as BP, they may well think a f alling share price and the market
f or corporate control the only necessary monitoring mechanism. But Wilks’ interesting book cannot
challenge the empirical validity of  that assertion, f or it is no empirical study. For instance, recently published
empirical research by scholars at Harvard Law School and the business schools at Duke and Columbia
indicates that policy makers and institutional investors shouldn’t accept assertions that activist
interventions are detrimental in the long term and invariably result in a ‘pump and dump’ bailout bef ore
negative stock returns arrive; and such claims should be rejected as a basis f or limiting the rights and
powers of  shareholders.
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